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INTRODUCTION
Many international business transactions integrate an arbitration
clause into the agreement as companies choose to keep potential disputes
out of the court systems.1 Enforcement of the awards rendered pursuant to
* J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2019; Certificate in Dispute
Resolution from the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution.
1
See generally Richard R. W. Brooks & Sarath Sanga, Commercial
Arbitration Agreements Between Sophisticated Parties: An Empirical View,
SEMANTIC SCHOLAR (2013),
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such agreements is straightforward in the United States thanks to the
Federal Arbitration Act, as long as the United States is the forum for the
arbitration proceeding.2 Even if the forum is outside of U.S. jurisdiction,
several treaties, namely the Panama Convention3 and the New York
Convention,4 provide for recognition of a foreign arbitrated award by U.S.
courts, as well as recognition by U.S. courts of any annulment or
suspension judgments rendered by courts in the State where the arbitration
proceeding took place.5
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7b40/3f93d2fdc59aa8d7e1ea55da8ec0c787e00d
.pdf. International commercial agreements are more likely than their U.S.
domestic counterparts to include an arbitration clause. Id. at 12–14.
2
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Agreements in writing to arbitrate current or
future controversies “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id.
3
The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, or "Panama Convention," went into effect in 1976. 14 I.L.M. 336
(1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]. It provided for “enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards in Latin America,” which had been previously governed by a lessthan ideal mélange of three separate treaties (to none of which the United States
had been a party). John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and its
Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 1, 7–
8 (2000). The Panama Convention was intended to achieve the same results as the
New York Convention and has been successful in this to a large extent. Id. at 21–
23.
4
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, or “New York Convention,” entered into force in
1959. 21 UST 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See also 9 U.S.C. § 201
(2006) (the US Code section codifying the treaty). The New York Convention
primarily concerns itself “with the arbitration agreement and award—the starting
and ending points of the arbitral process—and not with the conduct of the
proceedings, except as that conduct may impair the award.” See Bowman, supra
note 3, at 24. For the purposes of this analysis, this difference is irrelevant, as the
on-point sections of the conventions, the Panama Convention’s Article 5 and the
New York Convention’s Article V are verbatim in relevant parts. When both
Conventions apply and all parties to the arbitration are citizens of states that are
signatories to the Panama Convention, the Panama Convention governs. Id. at 93–
94.
5
Both conventions create a presumption of recognition. See Panama
Convention, supra note 3, at art. 4 (“[a]n arbitral decision or award that is not
appealable . . . shall have the force of a final judicial judgement”); see also New
York Convention, supra note 4, at art. III (“[e]ach Contracting State shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them”); see also Bowman, supra
note 3, at 83–84 (“a movant seeking to confirm an award falling under the Panama
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However, two recent cases heard by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit have shed light on the intricacies of
enforcing foreign judgments, specifically when such judgments annul
arbitrated awards that have already been recognized by U.S. courts.6 The
first case being Pemex which presents an unusual situation where a U.S.
court declined to nullify a foreign arbitral award, despite the courts of the
foreign jurisdiction granting an annulment.7 The second case, Thai-Lao
Lignite, sees the Second Circuit side with the foreign jurisdiction, and
vacate a judgement based on an annulled foreign award.8 The two cases
together provide a road map to this relatively narrow issue for parties who
may seek recognition (or to avoid recognition) of a foreign arbitral award
in the Second Circuit, or in other U.S. jurisdictions where the Second
Circuit provides persuasive guidance. This article will summarize the
Pemex and Thai-Lao Lignite cases and then synthesize their respective
tests for whether an annulled foreign arbitral award should nonetheless be
given effect in the United States.

Convention in a United States court should be confident that it has presented a
prima facie case by submitting an authenticated original or copy of the arbitration
agreement and arbitral award”); see, e.g., TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.,
487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding in a case involving an arbitral award
annulled in the foreign jurisdiction that “because the arbitration award was
lawfully nullified by the country in which the award was made, appellants have
no cause of action in the United States to seek enforcement of the award under the
FAA or the New York Convention”). However, both conventions also provide
that jurisdictions where recognition and enforcement is sought may refuse to
recognize and enforce the arbitrated award if doing so would be “contrary to the
public policy” of that country. See Panama Convention, supra note 3, at art.
5(2)(b); see also New York Convention, supra note 4, at art. V(2)(b).
6
See Panama Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5(2)(b); see also New
York Convention, supra note 4, at art. V(2)(b); see also Baker Marine, Ltd. v.
Chevron, Ltd., 191 F.3d 194,197 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the permissive “may” in
“award may be refused,” but holding that the party seeking refusal of recognition
of the foreign judgments in that case had “shown no adequate reason for refusing
to recognize the judgements”).
7
Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V.
v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 1622, 197 L. Ed. 2d 746 (2017).
8
Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, 864 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2017).
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I.
A.

PEMEX
Introduction

The first words of Justice Jacobs’ opinion in the Pemex case are:
“[t]he truly unusual procedural history of this case requires us to reconcile
two settled principles that militate in favor of opposite results.”9 “Truly
unusual” is a valid way to describe the result of Pemex, where the Second
Circuit declined to enforce a judgment of a foreign court that annulled an
arbitrated award.10 Instead, the Second Circuit gave effect to the original
arbitral award for approximately $300 million, even after that award was
given no effect in the original forum state, Mexico.11
B.

Factual background

The Pemex case involved a contract dispute between two
companies, Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L.
De C.V. (COMMISA) and Pemex-Exploración Y Producción (PEP).12
COMMISA was a Mexican subsidiary of a United States construction and
military contracting corporation, while PEP was a subsidiary of Petroleos
Mexicanos, a petroleum company which acted on behalf of the Mexican
government.13 PEP and its parent company were both technically public
entities of the Mexican government, and Petroleos Mexicanos was
essentially the Mexican state’s oil and gas company.14
In 1997, COMMISA was contracted by PEP “to build oil
platforms in the Gulf of Mexico,” with the contract including an arbitration
clause that required contract disputes be arbitrated in Mexico City in
accordance with International Chamber of Commerce arbitration
regulations.15 Additionally, PEP was authorized under the contract to
unilaterally exercise an “Administrative Recission” clause if COMMISA
breached, and COMMISA was required to post performance bonds.16 In
2003, after COMMISA and PEP disagreed over certain logistical, cost,
9

Pemex, 832 F.3d at 97.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 97–98.
15
Id. at 98.
16
Id.
10
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and construction-related issues with the performance of the 1997 contract,
the two parties executed a new contract with “virtually-identical
arbitration and administrative rescission clauses” to the original contract.17
Despite the new contract, the parties were still unable to ensure a
successful deal.18 In 2004, PEP alleged that COMMISA had failed to meet
milestones set out in the contract.19 They ejected COMMISA from the job
sites (where construction was 94 percent complete) and announced their
intent “to administratively rescind the contracts.”20 COMMISA filed for
arbitration seated in Mexico City and beginning in 2005, even though PEP
had asserted that they were rescinding the contract.21 In a preliminary
award in late 2006, the arbitration panel enjoined PEP from collecting the
performance bonds COMMISA had posted until the final arbitral award
was issued.22 After the preliminary award/injunction was made by the
arbitral body, PEP raised its contention that under Mexican law the
administrative rescission it was pursuing was not subject to arbitration.23
As the arbitration proceeded, Mexican law changed in two notable
ways.24 First, in late 2007, jurisdiction for claims like COMMISA’s was
given exclusively to the Mexican Tax and Administrative court, and the
applicable statute of limitations was reduced from ten years to forty-five
days.25 Second, in mid-2009, Section 98 of the Law of Public Works and
Related Services was enacted, which ended arbitration for administrative
rescission claims like the ones COMMISA made against PEP.26
PEP had contended after the preliminary arbitration award that
administrative rescission was exempt from arbitration, since its use of
administrative rescission stemmed directly from the Mexican
government’s authority.27 However, the arbitration panel rejected this
argument and awarded $300 million in damages to COMMISA in
December 2009, finding that PEP had breached the contracts.28
COMMISA took the award to be confirmed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled in

17

Id.
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 98–99.
23
Id. at 99.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
18
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COMMISA’s favor in August 2010.29 PEP appealed that decision to the
Second Circuit while simultaneously fighting the award in Mexico in the
Eleventh Collegiate Court.30 With the Second Circuit appeal still pending,
the Mexican court ordered the $300 million award annulled on the basis
that the rescission was not arbitrable, due to the Mexican government’s
being involved through PEP, referencing Section 98 several times.31
The simultaneous action in the Second Circuit was remanded
down to the Southern District of New York for consideration of the effect
of the Mexican court’s decision.32 After hearing additional evidence on
“applicable Mexican legal provisions,” the district court declined to annul
the award, holding that doing so would “[violate] basic notions of justice
in that it [would apply] a law that was not in existence at the time the
parties' contract was formed and [would leave] COMMISA without an
apparent ability to litigate its claims.”33 The district court specifically
noted that Section 98 was applied retroactively “to favor a state
enterprise,” and that COMMISA would be unable to seek any remedy for
its claims since the claims would exceed the new, shortened statute of
limitations.34 PEP then appealed the judgment back to the Second
Circuit.35
C.

Holding

The Second Circuit held that the court for the Southern District of
New York did not exceed its authority nor abuse its discretion in declining
to nullify the arbitrated award or to include in its judgment the $106
million in performance bonds that PEP had collected.36 Giving effect to
the Mexican nullification of the award would, from Circuit Judge Jacobs,
“run counter to United States public policy and would (in the operative

29

Id.
Id. The Eleventh Collegiate Court is analogous to the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 100 (quoting the district court’s decision on the matter in
Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex
Exploración y Producción, 962 F.Supp.2d 642, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 97.
30
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phrasing) be ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just’
in this country.”37
D.

Reasoning

The Second Circuit based its holding on a narrow public policy
exception within the Panama Convention, which overcame the “pro
enforcement bias” of that agreement.38 To meet the exception, the court
listed four influencing factors: “(1) the vindication of contractual
undertakings and the waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of
retroactive legislation that disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need
to ensure legal claims find a forum; and (4) the prohibition against
government expropriation without compensation.”39
i.

The Panama Convention

Adopted in 1975, the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”) is an agreement
signed by nineteen American countries, including the United States and
Mexico that directs courts to generally enforce arbitral awards rendered
abroad.40 Within the text of the convention however, there are seven
enumerated exceptions to enforcement of a foreign ruling; these include
things like situations when a party could not present a defense at
arbitration and situations when the arbitration was not carried out
according to agreed-upon terms or in accordance with local laws.41 The
final exception, latched onto by the Second Circuit in Pemex, comes into
play when “the recognition or execution of the decision would be contrary
to the public policy (“order public”) of that State [where recognition and
execution is requested].”42
The Second Circuit in Pemex followed the reasoning of another
Second Circuit case, Ackermann v. Levine, in holding the Panama
Convention rule to mean that “[a] judgment is unenforceable as against
public policy to the extent that it is repugnant to fundamental notions of
what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.”43
37

Id.
Id. at 105–07.
39
Id. at 107.
40
See Panama Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5(2)(b).
41
Id. at art. 5(1)–5(2).
42
Id. at art. 5(2)(b).
43
See Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106 (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d
830, 831 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 842 (noting that two
38
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ii.

Considerations for the Public Policy Exception

The Pemex court considered “four powerful considerations” in
analyzing whether the “high hurdle” of the public policy exception would
apply.44 These were: “(1) the vindication of contractual undertakings and
the waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of retroactive
legislation that disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need to ensure
legal claims find a forum; and (4) the prohibition against government
expropriation without compensation.”45

a.

Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

The Second Circuit noted that the waiver of sovereign immunity
factor favored COMMISA, primarily since PEP had failed to raise the
issue of immunity (specifically, immunity from having to arbitrate the
rescission).46 PEP had knowingly entered into a contract that specifically
limited COMMISA to arbitration in seeking remedy for a breach—thus,
the immunity had been waived through the contract.47 The Second Circuit
held that allowing PEP’s claim of immunity would run counter to contract
law’s core idea: that parties’ expectations within the agreement (here,
COMMISA’s expectation that arbitration was a valid option) should be
enforced. 48

b.

Retroactive Legislation

According to the Second Circuit, the Mexican court’s retroactive
application of Section 98 had an impermissible negative effect on the
integrity of the contract.49 The Pemex court held “[r]etroactive legislation
that cancels existing contract rights is repugnant to United States law . . .
‘[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should
important considerations are the goal of comity, which drives the doctrine of
respecting foreign judgements, and the necessity of fairness to litigants).
44
See Pemex, 832 F.3d at 107.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 108 (“[c]ontract law . . . is designed to enforce parties’
contractual expectations” (quoting Hunt Constr. Grp. v. Brennan Beer
Gorman/Architects, P.C., 607 F.3d 10, 14 (2nd Cir. 2010)).
49
Id.
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have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly.’”50 With the PEP-COMMISSA contract, it was
“incontestable that the capacity of PEP to arbitrate was established in prior
law; that it was withdrawn with respect to certain disputes that had already
arisen; and that it was withdrawn in a way that frustrated contractual
expectation.”51

c.

Forum Avaliability

According to the Second Circuit, because COMMISA’s claims
were now subject to a shorter statute of limitations, as well as the changes
that Section 98 made to the arbitrability of administrative rescission
claims, COMMISA was “twice the victim of unforeseen changes in the
law.”52 Both of those changes resulted in COMMISA’s inability to have
its claims heard if the arbitration award was not enforced—this runs
entirely counter to the Second Circuit’s holding that “litigants with legal
claims should have an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”53

d.

Illegal Government Takings

Finally, PEP rescinded the contracts and removed
COMMISA from the project sites after the work was essentially finished,
and then the Mexican government legislatively removed all of
COMMISA’s routes to potential relief.54 These two facts deemed to mean
that a “taking of private property without compensation for the benefit of
the government” had occurred. 55 While this would be clearly
unconstitutional in the United States, the North American Free Trade
Agreement also contains a provision that prohibits expropriation without
payment of compensation.56
E.

Test as Articulated by Pemex

The Pemex case addressed whether to recognize a foreign
decision, namely the annulment of the arbitral award for COMMISA,
through the prism of the Panama Convention. Specifically, the court
50

Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).
Id.
52
Id. at 110.
53
Id. at 109–10.
54
Id. at 110–11.
55
Id. at 110.
56
Id.
51
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looked to Article 5 section 2(b) of the Panama Convention, which allows
a court discretion in recognition or execution of a foreign decision when
recognition would “offend the public policy of the state in which
enforcement is sought.”57
When making the decision, the court in Pemex started by stating
the exception “does not swallow the rule” of a preference for “recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgements.”58 The rule is a “standard [that]
is high, and infrequently met,” and judgements are against public policy
when they are “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and
just.”59 Such judgements include those that move to clearly “undermine
the public interest, the public confidence in the administration of the law,
or [the] security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private
property.”60
The Second Circuit looked to “four powerful considerations” to
test whether the district court’s refusal to confirm the award, in the face of
the Mexican annulment, met this high standard and qualified for the public
policy exception.61
First, the court addressed whether or not there had been a
contractual waiver of sovereign immunity.62 The court held that the
arbitration agreement between the parties functioned to waive sovereign
immunity for PEP, especially since PEP had only attempted to assert
sovereign immunity in the “twelfth-hour.”63
Second, the court considered the repugnance of retroactive
application of laws to U.S. law.64 The Mexican court stated that it was not
retroactively applying Section 98.65 However, the Second Circuit held that
the fact that law empowered PEP to arbitrate and then revoked that power
in regards to certain disputes with the passing of Section 98 removed any
remedy for COMMISSA against PEP. The court held that this revocation
was a retroactive application of the law.66 Adding to this, the court stated:

57

Id. at 105–06 (quoting Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
58
Id. at 106.
59
Id. at 107.
60
Id. at 106.
61
Id. at 107.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 107–08.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 108.
66
Id. at 108–109.
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“[t]hat PEP is part of the government that promulgated the law does not
help at all.”67
Third, the Second Circuit held that “COMMISA’s inability to
have its breach of claims heard magnifies the injustice.”68 It stated, based
on the idea of forum non conveniens: “litigants with legal claims should
have an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”69 In Pemex, if
COMMISA’s award was not confirmed, COMMISA would not have faced
just a statute of limitations barrier but also res judicata issues in Mexican
court.70
Finally, the court considered whether or not there had been a
government taking without compensation. Citing Tahoe-Sierra
Presidential Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,71 the
Second Circuit held that the state-owned PEP’s seizure of the project sites
without compensation and the subsequent removal of relief by Mexican
law combined to mean that there had been an unconstitutional taking under
United States law.72
II.

THAI-LAO LIGNITE CO

The year after the Pemex decision the Second Circuit, again,
addressed the issue of the enforcement of annulled foreign arbitral awards
in Thai-Lao Lignite.73 However, in the Thai-Lao Lignite case, the party
petitioning the court did so with a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgement, meaning that there was more to consider than the bare
international law concerns of the Panama Convention.74 But, there is
67

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
69
Id. at 109.
70
Id. at 110.
71
See id. at 110 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002) ("When the government physically takes
possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical
duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is
taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.")).
72
Id. at 110–11.
73
Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 177 (2nd Cir. 2017).
74
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“On motion and just terms, the court may
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed
or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable”) (emphasis added).
See also Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
864 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2017).
68
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significant overlap between Rule 60(b) considerations and the Panama
Convention and New York Convention, with analysis for those
conventions dovetailing nicely in to the Federal Rules requirements within
the Second Circuit.
A.

Factual background

As with the Pemex case, Thai-Lao Lignite Co. involved a dispute
surrounding an allegedly wrongfully terminated business contract.75 In
1994, Thai-Lao Lignite Co., LTD (“TLL”), a Thai corporation, and the
Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (“Laos”) signed the
contract in question.76 By agreement, TLL had done business conducting
mining operations in Laos for several years prior.77
The 1994 contract was a “Project Development Agreement”
(“PDA”) that granted TLL the right to build and manage an electrical plant
near the mining site.78 Under the agreement, TLL would secure its own
funding for construction of the power plant.79 However, over the next
twelve years, TLL failed to obtain funding, due in part to a regional
financial downturn from 1997-2000.80 In 2006, Laos contacted TLL to
express concern that the company would not fulfill its obligations under
the PDA.81 TLL’s response did not satisfy Laos, and in October 2006, Laos
notified TLL that Laos was terminating the PDA.82 TLL contended that
the termination lacked appropriate procedure, and thus, Laos breached the
PDA.83
After failing to reach a settlement, the two parties initiated
arbitration proceedings in 2007 in Malaysia, according to the forum
selection clause in the PDA.84 The hearing was in mid-2009, and in
November 2009, the arbitration panel issued an award for TLL.85 The
panel ruled that TLL’s failure to raise required funding did not breach the
PDA, but that Laos’s subsequent termination of the contract did constitute
75

Id. at 177.
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 178.
85
Id.
76
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a breach. 86 In total, the panel awarded a little over $5 million to TLL,
including $40 million in investment costs, $4 million in lost opportunity
costs, and interest and attorney’s fees.87 Malaysian law incorporates a
limitation that an application to set aside an arbitrated award must be made
within ninety days of the award’s issuance; Laos did not apply to set aside
the award before the deadline in February 2010.88
In June 2010, TLL began efforts to enforce the award by filing an
action in New York state court that sought confirmation of the Malaysian
panel’s judgment.89 Laos immediately removed the action to federal court,
namely to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.90 In district court, Laos argued that the action be dismissed, asserting
that the panel had wrongfully incorporated costs and had decided issues
related to other contracts between the parties signed prior to the PDA.91 In
August 2011, the district court ruled for TLL and enforced the arbitrated
award, concluding that Laos’s objections “did not raise issues of
jurisdiction or arbitrability,” and thus fell outside of the New York
Convention’s grounds for non-enforcement.92 The court held further that
even if Laos had raised either of these appropriate challenges, the court
still would have enforced the award since “the parties agreed to delegate
questions of arbitrability and jurisdiction to the panel.”93 Laos appealed
the district court judgment to the Second Circuit, who affirmed the ruling
below.94
Concurrent with its efforts to obtain enforcement in the United
States, TLL had also sought the same legal action in the UK and France.95
86

Id.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 179.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. The New York Convention also allows for refusal to enforce an
award if “[t]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration may be recognized and enforced . . .” United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(c), June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
93
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 179 (quoting Thai-Lao Lignite
(Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87844, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011)).
94
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 179.
95
Id.
87
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In 2010, TLL was successful in the High Court of Paris; however, a
Parisian appeals court subsequently reversed that judgment, concluding
the “Panel had improperly ruled on matters outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement.”96 The High Court of Justice of England and Wales
held for TLL and enforcement of the award in August 2011, as well.97
Shortly after filing with the district court in New York, Laos had
requested that that court stay the proceeding because Laos “had moved in
Malaysia to set aside the award.”98 However, Laos’ counsel in Malaysia
had not in fact filed the action in that country, so the district court
proceeded with the action.99 However, the Malaysian High Court
eventually accepted Laos’ application to set aside the award and at the
same time granted an extension to the statute of limitations for filing such
an application.100
In December 2012, the Malaysian High Court “annulled the
[a]ward, and ordered re-arbitration of the dispute before a new panel.”101
The High Court held that while other courts (including in the U.S.) had
already rejected Laos’ other challenges, the arbitration panel had indeed
exceeded its jurisdiction and among other things had “impermissibly
lumped together or co-mingled” the separate issues of the PDA and the
prior contracts.102 The Malaysian Court of Appeal affirmed the High
Court’s judgement in 2014.103
Two months after the initial annulment, in February 2013, Laos
moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), (“Rule 60(b)”), to
vacate the district court judgement in New York, citing the Malaysian
annulment.104 This was more than a year and a half after the district court
had originally entered judgment for TLL.105 TLL objected to the motion
to vacate, arguing first that Laos should not have been granted an extension
by the Malaysian court to file the set-aside action and, arguing second, that
Laos’ illegal conduct was inequitable and should keep Laos from any Rule
60(b) relief.106
96
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Id.
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See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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105
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 180.
106
Id.
97

2019

ARBITRAL ANNULMENT ENFORCEMENT

485

The district court granted the Rule 60(b) motion in February 2014
and vacated its previous judgement against Laos.107 In doing so, it held
that it was required by the New York Convention to give effect to the
Malaysian set-aside judgement, unless “giving effect to the judgment
would violate our ‘fundamental notions of what is decent and just.’”108 The
court weighed the alleged misconduct by Laos when applying this
standard, but found that the issues did not “rise to the level of violating
basic notions of justice such that [it] should ignore comity considerations
and disregard the Malaysian judgments."109 TLL requested that the court
require Laos to post security while an appeal to the order to vacate was
pending—this was denied.110
Further, the district court rejected TLL’s request to enforce the
judgement from the English court, holding that “the later Malaysian
judgment should have priority because Malaysia, as the seat of the
arbitration and therefore the primary jurisdiction under the New York
Convention, had the sole authority to determine whether the arbitral award
was valid and, if not, to set it aside."111 TLL appealed the district court
case to the Second Circuit.112
B.

Holding

The Second Circuit affirmed the vacating order from the district
court. The Circuit court concluded that the district court acted
appropriately in not recognizing the English judgement and in not
requiring Laos to post security pending appeal.113
C.

Reasoning

In addressing the annulment of the Malaysian award, the Second
Circuit looked first to Rule 60(b), which covers the grounds for relief from
judgements available to litigants in federal courts.114 Next, it addressed
Article 5 of the N.Y. Convention,115 which covers recognition and
107
Id.
See id. at 180–81 (quoting Thai-Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of the Lao
People's Democratic Republic, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
109
See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
110
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 181.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
115
See 21 UST 2517.
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enforcement of awards from foreign arbitrations.116 Both of these
emphasize a preference for respecting the previous judgement or award,
and place a strong burden on the parties opposing the judgements.
i.

Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) was not considered in the Pemex case, but addresses
the federal standard for relief from rulings and reads in relevant part:
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or
Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
....
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable117
The Second Circuit noted that the relief provided by this statute is
to be “based on the particular circumstances of the case, taking into
account the reason for any delay, the possible prejudice to the non-moving
party, and the interests of finality.”118 Also, the relief falls into equity, so
it is not available if the party requesting relief “is found to have acted
inequitably.”119 as “final judgements should not be lightly reopened.”120
ii.

The New York Convention

The New York Convention of 1958121 addressed recognition
across borders of arbitrated awards, and was adopted by the members of
the United Nations.122 Essentially identical to the later Panama
Convention, the New York Convention, in its Article 5, lays out grounds
art. V.

116

See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 181; see also 21 UST 2517

117

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 182 (internal quotation marks

118

omitted).

119

Id.
Id. (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)).
121
See 21 UST 2517.
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Id.
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for non-recognition of foreign judgements through seven exceptions to the
general rule that such judgements should be enforced.123 Those exceptions,
like the exceptions under the Panama Convention, cover situations where
a party is unable to present their defense, where the arbitration procedures
that were agreed upon or were laws of the forum jurisdiction were not
followed, or, with relevance to the Thai-Lao Lignite case, where the award
has been “set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”124 The final
exception under Article 5 section 2(b) is especially relevant: recognition
and enforcement may be refused if “. . . (b) The recognition or enforcement
of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [the country where
recognition is sought].”125
The Second Circuit, in Thai-Lao Lignite, cited Pemex’s holding
that “the prudential concern of international comity” governs the ultimate
scope of a court’s discretion in choosing to enforce or to not enforce a
judgement coming from a foreign jurisdiction under the New York
Convention’s Article 5 exceptions.126 Pemex’s recognition of a “strong
presumption in favor of following the primary jurisdiction’s ruling” was
also adopted by the Second Circuit. 127 The analysis of the Thai-Lao
Lignite court differed from the analysis in Pemex however, since there was
no consideration of Rule 60(b) in that previous ruling.
TLL argued before the Second Circuit that Rule 60(b)’s
preference for both finality of judgements and deference to foreign
decisions was not weighed heavily enough by the district court. This
meant, according to TLL, that Laos had incorrectly lacked the burden to
demonstrate their entitlement to 60(b) relief from the 2011 U.S.
judgement.128 Laos’ opposing argument was that the New York
Convention requires “giving conclusive effect to the Malaysian annulment
of the [a]ward.”129
Preliminarily, the Second Circuit found that Rule 60(b) applied to
motions to vacate awards that are subsequently annulled.130 For this, it
cited Article 3 of the New York Convention, which calls for enforcement
of awards “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where
123
21 UST 2517 art. V(1) (stating that “[r]ecognition and enforcement
of the award may be refused . . . only if” the party against whom the judgement is
invoked provides proof of seven exceptions).
124
21 UST 2517 art. V(1)(e).
125
21 UST 2517 art. V(2)(b).
126
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 183–84.
127
Id. at 184.
128
Id. at 184–85.
129
Id. at 185.
130
Id.
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the award is relied upon.”131 The court held that “[i]n our view, Rule 60(b)
is one such ‘rule of procedure.’"132
iii.

“the full range of considerations”

The Second Circuit held that Rule 60(b) motions, based on laterannulled arbitral awards, are not governed entirely by the New York
Convention’s “concern for comity.”133 Rather, “the full range of Rule
60(b) considerations, including the weighty interests served by protecting
the finality of judgments of our courts” must be considered.134 Further,
courts “must be attentive to the fact that the burden of demonstrating the
vacatur is appropriate lies with the party seeking that result.”135 This
burden “need not be an onerous” one though, “and it need not require too
much more from the district court than was done here,” but it “does require
recognition and consideration of the interests protected by Rule 60(b).”136
Applying this to the Thai-Lao Lignite facts, the Second Circuit
“presume[d] that the district court, in its diligence, considered the Rule
60(b) factors,” even while noting that a more explicit consideration by the
lower court “would have been helpful.”137 The Second Circuit based its
presumption on a number of observations of the district court’s
reasoning.138
First, it noted that the district court “gave some explicit
consideration to the interests of justice” in noting that the Malaysian
annulment “did not leave [TLL] . . . without a remedy,” and noting that
the dispute would be re-arbitrated.139 This contrasted with Pemex, where a
particular combination of changed laws, statute of limitation issues, and
an annulment came together to “preclude[e] any future recovery.”140
Next, the Second Circuit looked at the district court’s recognition
of what the appellate court called “far less suspect” circumstances in the
Malaysian proceedings contrasted with the circumstances around the

131
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Id. at 185.
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proceedings in Pemex.141 These “less suspect” circumstances meant that
the annulment ruling was “more worthy of presumptive recognition.”142
While not explicitly spelled out in Thai-Lao Lignite, the concerning
circumstances in Pemex that the court refers to seem likely to be the
changes in Mexican laws that happened to benefit a government-owned
entity in a potentially very expensive arbitration.143 In Pemex, the Second
Circuit had used the “four powerful considerations” of public policy:
waiver of sovereign immunity, repugnancy of retroactive legislation, the
need to find a forum, and a concern for illegal government takings.144 In
Thai-Lao Lignite however, the court held that while “we might not
necessarily agree with the merits of the Malaysian courts' judgments, we
see no grounds for such concerns.”145

a.

Inequitable Conduct

The Second Circuit continued its analysis by concluding that the
“inequitable conduct” that TLL asserted Laos engaged in did not “justif[y]
denying Laos the relief from enforcement that it requests.”146 It found that
the allegedly inequitable conduct was “largely, the merits of legal
positions taken, and not egregious behavior of another sort,” and had
already been properly addressed and given no weight by the district court
below prior to the appeal.147
Some of the principal conduct that TLL complained about
involved Laos’ failure to comply in timely fashion with discovery orders
from the district court—this was also considered by the court below which
declined at the time to issue sanctions upon TLL’s request.148 The Second
Circuit held that if the district court had considered the conduct “in the
141

Id.
Id.
143
See Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L.
De C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 110 (2nd Cir., 2016)
(“PEP, acting on behalf of the Mexican government, rescinded the contracts and
forcibly removed COMMISA from the project sites. Then, by legislation, Mexico
frustrated relief that had been granted to COMMISA in the arbitral forum and
consigned it to a forum in which relief was foreclosed both by the statute of
limitations and res judicata. . . . the enforcement of [the new] Mexican law
amounted to a taking of private property without compensation for the benefit of
the government.”).
144
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 187.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 188.
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context of Laos’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion,” the lower court would still not
have found the issue so egregious as to be enough to “justify its continued
enforcement of an annulled award.”149 It seemed to agree with Laos’
argument that if the district court would have held that the conduct was
enough to prevent vacatur of the annulment, Laos would have been on the
hook for a $57 million judgement that would have essentially been
equivalent to a discovery sanction, an impliedly unnecessarily “steep fine
indeed.”150
Other conduct by Laos that TLL complained about “is best
described as either unnecessarily combative or careless,” and the Second
Circuit was “not persuaded that it demonstrate[d] the kind of ‘chutzpah’
that has led courts in this Circuit to deny otherwise merited relief, or that
the [d]istrict [c]ourt . . . would have seen as outcome-determinative.”151 To
support this, the Second Circuit contrasted Laos’ behavior with the
behavior in one of the Circuit’s previous cases, Uzan, where Rule 60(b)
relief had been denied because the moving party had “not pursued their
defense with clean hands[,] . . . time and again . . . rais[ing] legal
roadblocks to the enforcement of the judgment against them . . . and
persistently endeavor[ing] to evade the lawful jurisdiction of the [d]istrict
[c]ourt and undermine its careful and determined work.”152 Laos’
behavior, according to the court, fell far short of the “persistent disrespect
and noncompliance for which we and the district court criticized the
unsuccessful movants in Uzan.”153

b.

Interest in Finality

Last, the Second Circuit considered the “interest in finality,”
which protects harm to the previously prevailing party from “repeated and
otherwise unfounded challenges to its judgments.”154 It rejected Laos’
contention that the timing of a motion to vacate is “irrelevant,” saying that
“[h]ad ten years elapsed before the set-aside proceedings were concluded,”
plus “more time elapsed before Laos moved to vacate the [a]ward,”
finality interests may have overcome the “deference to the primary
149

Id. at 188.
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. (citing Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 127–28
150
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jurisdiction presumptively called for by the New York Convention.”155
However, the court found that the district court acted properly in vacating
the prior judgement due to the Malaysian annulment, in part because TLL
knew that annulment proceedings were ongoing even while TLL was
seeking to have their award enforced in the district court.156 Also, Laos
had “sought relief promptly” once the Malaysian court annulled the
arbitral award.157

c.

TLL’s Request for Posting of Security

The district court did not require Laos to post security for the
amount of the contested award for two reasons.158 First, “requiring Laos,
a foreign sovereign, to post security would be tantamount to attachment of
Laos’ assets,” violating the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA).159
Second, the lower court remarked that even without a FISA bar, it would
still not require the security based on its discretion.160 The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court simply saying that the lower court would have
been within its discretion either way; and thus, the question of whether or
not FISA would bar the security request did not need to be addressed.161

d.

Enforcement of the English Judgment

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected TLL’s argument that the
judgment previously secured in England against Laos should be enforced
based on the New York Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgements
Recognition Act.162 Under that provision, TLL had filed for enforcement
and the clerk of court had issued a notice of default against Laos in the
Southern District of New York after Laos had failed to initially appear.163
155

Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 189.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012) (“The property in the
United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity in the United
States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State
after the effective date of this Act, if. . . . (1) the foreign state has waived its
immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly
or by implication . . . .”).
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Laos subsequently appeared before the default judgement was entered and
moved to vacate the default, in response to which the district court placed
the burden on TLL to show cause as to why the English judgement should
not be denied enforcement.164 After hearing TLL’s response the district
court denied enforcement of the judgement, based on leeway within the
New York statue for “conflicts with [other] final and conclusive
judgment[s]” and equitable considerations, and then, closed the case.165
The Second Circuit agreed in a straightforward manner with the district
court’s reasoning and affirmed the order denying the petition to enforce
the judgement.166
D. Test as Articulated in Thai-Lao
Unlike Pemex, where recognition of a foreign decision was
viewed through the lens of the Panama Convention only, the court in ThaiLao was forced to address FRCP Rule 60(b) in addition to an international
treaty. The Second Circuit overlaid the Rule 60(b) elements onto the New
York Convention considerations, coming up with a test that satisfied both
the FRCP and the Convention.167 This test looked at the reasonableness of
the time period between the initial judgement and the motion to vacate, the
equitable conduct of the party moving to vacate, and a balance between
concerns for justice and finality and the concern for international
comity.168
The timing of Laos’ motion to vacate was held not to be
unreasonable so that it outweighed the deference to the primary
jurisdiction, Malaysia.169 This timing is a part of the interest in finality
specifically, “which protects the prevailing party’s (and the courts’)
tangible interest in avoiding the costs, uncertainty, and even disrespect
reflected by repeated and otherwise unfounded challenges to its
judgments.”170 The court stated that ten years of set-aside proceedings plus
additional time for Laos to move to vacate “might well outweigh the
deference” but did not hold that the current case’s timeline (three years
from the arbitrated award to the conclusion of the Malaysian set-aside
action and then two months from the annulment to the motion to vacate)
164
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combined with the prompt seeking of relief by Laos was enough to keep
Laos from relief.171
Laos’ “inequitable conduct” was not enough to bar relief either,
since it involved “the merits of legal positions taken, and not egregious
behavior of another sort.”172 The court did not detail what this “behavior
of another sort” might be, but went on to quote the district court that Laos’
conduct regarding discovery orders “did not ‘evince[] bad faith or serious
and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice,’ as would be
required to warrant a sanctions award,” and that Laos had taken
“reasonable (if ultimately mistaken) legal position[s].”173 The Second
Circuit noted that this district court analysis of Laos’ conduct had not been
in the context of Rule 60(b) but held that it would nonetheless generate
same ultimate result if the lower court had been considering Rule 60(b).174
Further, other conduct by Laos was “unnecessarily combative or careless,”
not reaching the level of the unclean hands and “persistent disrespect and
noncompliance” of the movant denied in Uzan.175
The Second Circuit looked to the interests of justice, noting that
there was, unlike in Pemex, a route to a remedy for TLL (through rearbitration).176 In the context of the interests of justice, the court
acknowledged the “four powerful considerations” articulated in Pemex,
but found that they were unnecessary in Thai-Lao since the Malaysian
proceedings were “far less suspect and therefore more worthy of
presumptive recognition.”177
Combining this lack of “suspect” proceedings with a reasonable
timetable for Laos’ motion, the Second Circuit declined to hold that the
concern for international comity was outweighed.178
III.

COMBINING THE TESTS

Pemex and Thai-Lao provided a test applicable at least within the
Second Circuit that can be synthesized. For situations where an arbitral
award is annulled in its jurisdiction of origin, Pemex focused on an
international treaty, and Thai-Lao expanded the treaty analysis to include
171
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a number of factors connected to Rule 60(b).179 The combined test looks
to a balance of justice and comity, specifically at “four powerful
considerations,” and then gives consideration to an interest in the finality
of judgements/timeliness of relief and to the equitable conduct of the party
seeking relief.
Whether a court chooses to apply the Panama Convention or the
New York Convention, “[t]here is no substantive difference between the
two: both evince a ‘pro-enforcement bias.’”180 Under both conventions,
this enforcement is to be effected according to the laws of the state where
enforcement is sought.181 This bias comes from a concern for
“international comity,”182 with the goal of promoting “cooperation and
reciprocity” and stands despite all but some of the most substantial
challenges.183 Overriding this presumption in favor of the primary
179

Id. at 186 (“[I]n ruling on a Rule 60(b)(5) motion, even in the context
of a judgment entered on a foreign arbitral award under the New York
Convention, a district court should be guided by the full range of interests
protected by Rule 60(b). Courts should consider whether the motion was made
within a reasonable time, whether the movant acted equitably, and whether
vacatur would strike an appropriate balance between serving the ends of justice
and preserving the finality of judgments, as well as the prudential concern for
international comity.”).
180
Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De
C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 105 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 1622, 197 L. Ed. 2d 746 (2017).
181
Article III of the New York Convention places on each contracting
state the obligation to “recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles.” Thai-Lao Lignite
Co., 864 F.3d at 183; see also Panama Convention, 14 I.L.M. 336 art. 4 (“[An
arbitral award’s] execution or recognition may be ordered in the same manner as
that of decisions handed down by national or foreign ordinary courts, in
accordance with the procedural laws of the country where it is to be executed and
the provisions of international treaties.”).
182
Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106 (“Although courts in this country have long
recognized the principles of international comity and have advocated them in
order to promote cooperation and reciprocity with foreign lands, comity remains
a rule of ‘practice, convenience, and expediency,’ rather than of law.” (quoting
Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d
Cir. 1997))).
183
See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 186 (“[U]nder the Convention,
the power and authority of the local courts of the [primary jurisdiction] remain of
paramount importance.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Yusuf
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22 (2nd Cir. 1997))).
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jurisdiction must, under either convention’s Article 5, involve an appeal
to “fundamental notions of what is decent and just” and be against the
public policy of the United States.184
Pemex balanced justice and comity with “four powerful
considerations,” which test whether recognizing and enforcing a foreign
award would run afoul of that public policy.185 These four considerations
are: “(1) the vindication of contractual undertakings and the waiver of
sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of retroactive legislation that
disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need to ensure legal claims find
a forum; and (4) the prohibition against government expropriation without
compensation.”186
In the United States, valid contractual waivers of sovereign
immunity must be enforced.187 Contract law “is designed to enforce
parties’ contractual expectations,”188 and parties cannot, as in Pemex,
validly contract for arbitration but then subsequently invoke sovereign
immunity.189 A judgement that allows a party to invoke sovereign
immunity in that situation would be against the public policy of the United
States.190

“The annulment of an arbitral award in the primary jurisdiction should therefore
be given significant weight.” Id.
184
Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106. Enforcement of the [foreign] judgement must
“offend the public policy” of the United States, which would mean the judgement
is “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just.” Id. Another
federal circuit, the Fifth, has held that limiting a seaman’s choice-of-law by
contract in an arbitration clause is not enough to meet the high standard of the
public policy exception in the New York Convention. See Asignacion v. Rickmers
Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG, 783 F.3d 1010, 1018–20 (5th Cir.
2015) (“[W]e should be reluctant to conclude that lesser remedies make an award
unenforceable on policy grounds . . . . [T]he district court only determined that
the arbitration and award “effective[ly] deni[ed]” Asignacion the right to pursue
his general maritime remedies. But that finding is insufficient to support the
conclusion that the public policy of the United States requires refusing to enforce
the award.”) (emphasis added).
185
Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106.
186
Id. at 107.
187
Id.; see also C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418–23 (2001) (“[T]he Tribe clearly consented to
arbitration and to the enforcement of arbitral awards . . . the Tribe thereby waived
its sovereign immunity from . . . suit.”).
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Hunt Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Brennan Beer Gorman/Architects, P.C., 607
F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2010).
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The Pemex court held that “[r]etroactive legislation that cancels
existing contract rights is repugnant to United States law [because]
‘[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should
have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly.’”191 It is against public policy to penalize a party who
contracts under a law simply because that law is retroactively changed.192
The Second Circuit held that “litigants with legal claims should
have an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”193 A statute of
limitations bar enacted retroactively, so that a party effectively never has
an opportunity to bring a claim, might be enough to trigger this
consideration that legal claims must find a forum.194 However, certainly if
a party must contend with statute of limitations issues plus more barriers,
an “injustice” results.195 In Pemex, one such additional issue creating
equitable concerns was res judicata—the Mexican court’s ruling applying
new laws retroactively silenced any future relief in court for the party
seeking to have the award upheld, and “[s]uch a result offends basic
domestic principles of claim preclusion.”196
It is against public policy for a judgment to constitute the “taking
of private property without compensation for the benefit of the
government.”197 The court in Pemex also noted that the North American
Free Trade Agreement likewise contains a provision that prohibits
191

Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)).
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Id. at 109. “The general rule of mootness is relaxed for issues that are
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left ‘without a chance of redress.’” Id. (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate
Com. Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
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Id. at 110.
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Id. (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“Under res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
action.”) (emphasis added by the court to the quotation)).
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Id. at 110. See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (“When the government physically takes
possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical
duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is
taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.”); see also TermoRio
S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The test of
public policy cannot be simply whether the courts of a secondary State would set
aside an arbitration award if the award had been made and enforcement had been
sought within its jurisdiction.”).
192
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expropriation without payment of compensation.198 Enforcement of an
arbitral award that would amount to an illegal government taking in the
United States would obviously be against the public policy of the United
States.199
Thai-Lao saw these four considerations as one part of the test
when looking at a Rule 60(b) motion as well, since they provided insight
as to whether or not recognition of the foreign award would be contrary to
the “ends of justice”.200 However, these four factors do not need to be
considered in every case.201 In Thai-Lao, the court stated, “we see no
grounds for such concerns,” referring to these four factors, after looking at
the circumstances in the Malaysian proceedings.202 Impliedly,
circumstances that would necessitate the four-factor test of public policy
violation (and thus potentially impact the ends of justice) would be those
like in Pemex, where a government-owned party benefits from changed
laws and circumvents basic tenets of contract law (deference to party
choice).203
The second factor for considering Rule 60(b) motions from ThaiLao is an interest in the finality of judgments.204 Essentially, this factor
looks to whether the original judgment (in Thai-Lao, the original
enforcement award) has been around for so long that it is “locked in” and
should not be changed. This interest in finality might be overcome by

198

Pemex, 832 F.3d at 110.
Id. at 111 (holding that the Mexican judgement annulling the arbitral
award and amounting to an illegal taking “would undermine public confidence in
laws and diminish rights of personal liberty and property.”) (emphasis added).
200
Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 184 (2d Cir. 2017).
201
Id. at 187.
202
See id. (holding that the Malaysian proceedings were “far less
suspect” than the proceedings in Mexico in Pemex).
203
See id. See also TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d
928, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Because there is nothing in the record here indicating
that the proceedings before the Consejo de Estado were tainted or that the
judgment of that court is other than authentic, the District Court was, as it held,
obliged to respect it.”); see also Getma Int'l v. Republic of Guinea, 862 F.3d 45,
50 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“there is scant evidence of taint in the [foreign] proceedings,
and we see no infirmities that prejudiced Getma in a manner so offensive to “basic
notions of morality and justice” as to justify disregarding the [foreign] decision.”).
204
“Properly applied Rule 60(b) strikes a balance between serving the
ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793
F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). The interest in finality can be described as “ensuring
that litigation reaches an end within a finite period of time.” See House v.
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 688 F.2d 7, 9 (1982).
199
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“extraordinary circumstances” like those of Pemex.205 The timing of the
motion comes into play as well—Thai-Lao holds that ten years of set-aside
proceedings between the original foreign judgment and the annulment plus
more for the Rule 60(b) motion process “might” be enough to overcome
the interest in finality.206 A shorter time, like the three years in Thai-Lao,
is likely not enough for a court following the Second Circuit test to find
that the interest in the finality of such a relatively recent judgment is so
strong that the judgment cannot be overturned.207
Finally, the equitable conduct of the party seeking nonrecognition of the foreign judgment must also be assessed. Here, “unclean
hands” can be enough to deny relief via Rule 60(b), as in Motorola Credit
Corporation v. Uzan, where the party requesting relief had “persistently
endeavored to evade the lawful jurisdiction of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”208 The
conduct in that case was described as “persistent disrespect and
noncompliance” by the Second Circuit in Thai-Lao, and was an example
of the kind of conduct that would prevent a party from Rule 60(b) relief.209
There is at least some consideration of the amount of the judgment in
connection with whatever this conduct might be. In Thai-Lao, some of the
alleged “inequitable conduct” was related to discovery.210 The court there
found that enforcing the foreign judgment based only on relatively
innocuous discovery-related actions by the party seeking non-recognition
of the judgment would essentially result in a massive discovery
sanction.211 This, the court implied, would not be in keeping with the
interests of justice.212
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See also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia), 741 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the interest in
finality was overcome with “extraordinary circumstances”).
206
Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 189 (2d Cir. 2017).
207
But see Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 741 F.3d at 357 (“Whenever the
law changes, parties who lost a prior case because of the now-altered law may
feel that justice was not done. Generally, the interest in finality outweighs that
concern.”).
208
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 128 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009).
209
Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 188.
210
See id. at 187–88.
211
Id. at 188.
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Id.

2019

ARBITRAL ANNULMENT ENFORCEMENT

499

CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s addressing of this narrow issue in
these two cases provides at least some direction for parties seeking
enforcement of foreign judgments regarding arbitral awards in the United
States. However, between Pemex and Thai-Lao there is still plenty of room
for subsequent cases with distinguishable facts.
The “truly unusual” (read: egregious) facts in Pemex meant that
all “four powerful considerations” readily favored non-enforcement of the
foreign judgment. But what happens when, for example, legislation is
actively applied retroactively (one factor) but there is none of the
governmental expropriation (another factor) found in Pemex? Similarly,
the Thai-Lao court’s assertion that ten years “might” be enough to lock in
a previous judgment, and thus induce a court to decline to enforce a
subsequent set-aside, leaves a continuing question. Consider a
hypothetical future case with an initial judgment enforced in the Second
Circuit, say, nine years before the set-aside judgment in the foreign
jurisdiction is rendered. How many of the other factors (the four powerful
considerations as well as equitable concerns) would have to weigh in favor
of non-enforcement for the court to say “nine years seems like too much
time, since the finality of judgments is important and combining this with
the other factors we hold that the subsequent judgment should not be
enforced”?
This then must be the main takeaway from these two cases; the
factors articulated in Pemex and Thai-Lao are just that: factors. Pemex
gave an example of when almost all the factors favored non-enforcement
of the foreign arbitral judgment, and Thai-Lao, while providing some
contrasting guidance in dicta, gave an example of when almost all the
factors favored enforcement of the foreign judgment. Therefore, while the
test for whether foreign arbitral set-aside judgments should be enforced in
the Second Circuit is now relatively clear, future precedent is necessary to
better predict how varying facts will be analyzed using the test.
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